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THE ANTITRUST STANDARD FOR UNLAWFUL 
EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT 
 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
 
This essay gives a very general definition of unlawful 
exclusionary conduct under '2 of the Sherman Act, considers some 
alternatives, and then explains what is and is not involved in 
assessing conduct under the given definition. 
 
General definition of anticompetitive exclusion 
 
We define monopolistic conduct as acts that: 
 
 (1) are reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or 
prolonging monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of 
rivals; and 
 
 (2) that either (2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are 
unnecessary for the particular consumer benefits claimed for 
them, or (2c) produce harms disproportionate to any resulting 
benefits. 
 
 In addition, the practice must be reasonably susceptible to 
judicial control, which means that the court must be able to identify 
the conduct as anticompetitive and either fashion an appropriate 
deterrent or an equitable remedy likely to improve competition.1 
                                                 
     *Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor or Law, University of Iowa College of 
Law. 
     1See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Harvard and Chicago Schools and the 
Dominant Firm, in Conservative Economic Influences on U.S. Antitrust Policy 
(Robert Pitofsky, ed., Oxford University Press, 2008); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 Univ. Chicago L.Rev. 147 (2005).  In Microsoft 
the D.C. Circuit defined a test of equivalent generality, although in considerably 
more detail, and including allocation of proof burdens: 
 
 First, to be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist's act must have an 
"anticompetitive effect." That is, it must harm the competitive process and 
thereby harm consumers. In contrast, harm to one or more competitors will 
not suffice. 
 
 Second, the plaintiff, on whom the burden of proof of course rests, ... must 
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 Clause (1) of the test ensures that the conduct is both 
exclusionary and "substantial," in the sense that it is reasonably 
capable of creating or prolonging monopoly.  Clause (2a) deals with 
the easiest case for identifying anticompetitive exclusion; namely 
where no consumer benefit whatsoever can be shown.  Clause (2b) 
deals with situations where a less restrictive alternative might 
produce equivalent benefits, and clause number (2c) deals with the 
small number of situations thought to require some kind of balancing 
of harms and gains.  For example, in a reasonably close predatory 
pricing case one may have to determine whether monopoly pricing 
during a post-predation "recoupment" period are sufficient to offset 
any short run benefits that accrue to consumers during a period of 
very low prices.2 
                                                                                                                            
demonstrate that the monopolist's conduct indeed has the requisite 
anticompetitive effect....  [I]n a case brought by the Government, it must 
demonstrate that the monopolist's conduct harmed competition, not just a 
competitor. 
 
 Third, if a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case under ' 2 by 
demonstrating anticompetitive effect, then the monopolist may proffer a 
"procompetitive justification" for its conduct....  If the monopolist asserts a 
procompetitive justification--a nonpretextual claim that its conduct is 
indeed a form of competition on the merits because it involves, for 
example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal--then the 
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut that claim.... 
 
 Fourth, if the monopolist's procompetitive justification stands unrebutted, 
then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the 
conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit.... 
 
 Finally, in considering whether the monopolist's conduct on balance harms 
competition and is therefore condemned as exclusionary for purposes of ' 
2, our focus is upon the effect of that conduct, not upon the intent behind 
it. Evidence of the intent behind the conduct of a monopolist is relevant 
only to the extent it helps us understand the likely effect of the 
monopolist's conduct. 
 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
534 U.S. 952 (2001) (to the extent it is relevant, HH was consulted by the United 
States and some state AGs).  See 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Law &617 (3d ed. 2008). 
     2See Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 
(1993) (assessing these requirements); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons 
Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1069 (2007) (reiterating them in a case 
involving allegedly predatory buying). . 
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Alternative definitions 
 
The given definition of monopolistic conduct is very general, in 
the sense that it does not provide precise tests for specific practices, 
such as improper patent infringement suits3 or predatory pricing.4  
We leave those essential details for later.  Numerous definitions of 
exclusionary conduct have been proposed that are more focused or 
more technical than our stated definition.  Many of these are more 
useful for analyzing specific exclusionary practices than our own 
general definition.  However, these definitions are also "incomplete," 
in the sense that they do not account for every type of exclusionary 
conduct that the law of monopolization should condemn. 
 
 Further, alternative tests for monopolization are not merely 
technically different.  Some of them reflect judgments quite different 
than ours about when conduct by a monopolist should be regarded 
as unlawfully exclusionary, or different judgments about the ability of 
antitrust tribunals to detect and remedy exclusionary conduct. 
 
 We begin, however, by examining the broadest criteria for 
identifying anticompetitive conduct -- namely, "total welfare" and 
"consumer welfare" tests. 
 
"Welfare" tests for monopolization -- "total welfare" and "consumer 
welfare" 
 
 In economics a welfare test purports to measure how well off 
people are, perhaps as a result of a particular practice.  Such welfare 
tests typically use "willingness to pay" as a welfare criterion.  The 
"purest" welfare definition in neoclassical economics is the Pareto 
test, which declares that a state of affairs is efficient if no further 
movement exists that could benefit at least one person without also 
injuring someone else.  Because virtually all legal policies produce 
both gainers and losers pure Paretianism is much too strict a 
standard for evaluating legal policy.  Rather, economists sometimes 
use a variation called "potential Pareto efficiency," or Kaldor-Hicks 
                                                 
     3See 3 Antitrust Law &706. 
     4See Ch. 7C. 
4 Hovenkamp, EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT  
efficiency,5 which states that an economic change is efficient if those 
who gain from the change gain enough so that they can fully 
compensate any losers. 
 
 Under this test, which is the basis of modern cost-benefit 
analysis, a practice is efficient, or welfare increasing, if the sum of all 
gains, measured in some constant unit of value, exceeds the sum of 
all losses.  For example, a market movement from competition to 
monopoly harms welfare in this sense: although the monopolist 
gains, its gains are less than consumers lose.6  It can be shown 
mathematically that perfect competition in a perfectly functioning 
market maximizes Welfare in the Pareto sense.7  Such a market is 
also Kaldor-Hicks efficient. 
 
 Since competitive markets are the goal of antitrust, one is 
tempted to say that the proper definition of an unlawful exclusionary 
practice is one that reduces welfare, which should be the same as 
making the market less competitive.  Robert Bork argued in 1978 
that the proper test for antitrust practices is something which he 
called "consumer welfare," but by which he really meant "total 
welfare," or the sum of the welfare of all affected persons, including 
both consumers and producers.8 
 
 There are good reasons, grounded in both policy and 
                                                 
     5See Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal 
Comparisons of Utility, 49 Econ.J. 545 (1939); John R. Hicks, The Foundations of 
Welfare Economics, 49 Econ. J.  696 (1939). 
     6In the standard illustration of monopoly the monopolist's gain in higher 
prices is precisely offset by the consumer's loss from the same higher prices.  
However, there is also a "deadweight" loss consisting of unmade sales that do not 
profit the monopolist, and that harm consumers by forcing inferior choices.  
Because the deadweight loss triangle is a loss to consumers too, aggregate 
consumer losses exceed the monopolist's gains.  See 2B Phillip E. Areeda & 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &403 (3d ed. 2007); and Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Federal Antitrust Policy: the Law of Competition and its Practice ''1.2a, 2.3c (3d 
ed. 2005). 
     7This is the First Welfare Theorem.  See Kenneth J. Arrow and Gerard 
Debreu, The Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy,  22 
Econometrica 265 (1954). 
     8See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 90, 107-115 (1978) (consumer 
welfare is "merely another term for the wealth of the nation"). 
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administration, why total welfare in this sense is not a useful antitrust 
test.  First, while any move from monopoly to competition may be 
thought to increase welfare, this begs the question when we are 
looking for a legal test.  Surely an antitrust tribunal cannot measure 
and trade off all of the gains and losses that result from any specific 
practice except in the easiest and most unambiguous cases.  
Antitrust policy requires workable tests for making judgments about 
competitive effects.  Further, these tests must be reasonably 
administrable by the courts. 
 
 That is not to say that the concept of welfare is useless to 
antitrust analysis.  A practice that benefits consumers while doing no 
harm to producers, or that harms consumers greatly while producing 
only small benefits to producers can readily be identified as 
competitive or anticompetitive with little analysis.  But in most 
reasonably close cases ambiguities and tradeoffs make serious 
netting of gains and losses impossible. 
 
 Another objection to total welfare tests is that they are 
indifferent as between consumer and producer gains.  A practice that 
results in significantly higher prices to consumers would be lawful 
under a total welfare test if the gains that accrued to the monopolist 
(or cartel) were slightly greater than the losses suffered by 
consumers and no one else was affected.9  But the broadest 
constituency in our economy is consumers and the strong direction 
of antitrust policy has been to weigh consumer welfare higher than 
producer welfare, although perhaps this point should not be pushed 
too far.10  While this political objection seems weighty when applied 
to joint ventures or mergers, observable transactions that we tolerate 
because they benefit certain constituencies, it does seem less 
weighty when applied to the unilateral conduct of a monopolist. 
 
 An alternative to total welfare tests is the so-called "consumer 
                                                 
     9See Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 
Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1 (1982).  Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, note 6, '2.3c. 
     10Historically, while consumers represent the broadest interest group in the 
economy producer groups have been much more effective lobbyists.  Many 
statutory rules, including the antitrust laws, are best explained as favoring the 
special interests of politically powerful or clever producer groups.  On this point, 
see Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy note 6, '2.1; Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution, Ch. 2 (2006). 
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welfare" principle, which declares that antitrust practices should be 
evaluated by considering the impact on consumers, largely ignoring 
effects on producers or others.11  Under this test a practice that 
imposes consumer losses would be unlawful, even if it provided 
greater gains to the monopolist than the losses consumers 
encountered. 
 
 Such a test for monopolistic practices seems both 
overdeterrent and underdeterrent.  First, it would condemn practices 
that are not capable of excluding anyone.  Suppose that Microsoft, 
which has a monopoly in its Windows operating system, should 
develop a new version that was particularly buggy and prone to 
crashes.  Clearly, consumers as a group would be harmed because 
they have few good alternatives to Windows.  But developing a bad 
version of Windows is not a monopolistic practice because no one is 
excluded.  Microsoft's mistake might permit other firms to come in 
and steal sales, or it might simply impose harm on consumers until 
Microsoft fixed the problems and restored the status quo, but the one 
thing that the practice would clearly not do is exclude rivals from the 
market.  As a result, the practice is not "monopolistic," even though it 
causes consumer harm. 
 
 One might say that this is merely a technical objection.  The 
real intent of a consumer welfare test is to identify practices that both 
exclude rivals from the market and harm consumers.  But in that 
case the test is underdeterrent because antitrust must be able to 
identify and condemn harmful practices long before actual consumer 
                                                 
     11See Steven C. Salop, Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust 
Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, presented to 
the Antitrust Modernization Commission (Nov. 4, 2005), available at  
http://www.amc.gov/public_studies_fr28902/exclus_conduct_ 
pdf/051104_Salop_Mergers.pdf. 
 
 See also Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 
Antitrust L.J. 483, 518 (2006) (advocating a modified general welfare test that is 
solicitous of consumer welfare: 
 
 antitrust enforcers and courts should seek to maximize aggregate surplus, 
so long as consumers and producers sufficiently share the efficiency 
gains, at least on average.... 
 
And see Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers Should Guide Antitrust, 58 
Antitrust L.J. 631 (1988). 
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harm has occurred.  Consider the monopolist who files a wrongful 
patent infringement suit in order to maintain its monopoly.12  Such a 
lawsuit must be addressed by antitrust tribunals long before any 
consumer harm has resulted.  Indeed, under existing rules such 
claims are treated as compulsory counterclaims, which means that 
they must be evaluated at the same time as the monopolist's 
infringement action itself is evaluated.13 
 
 Here again, one might say that the consumer welfare 
standard works because even though no actual consumer harm 
results, such harm is in prospect: it will occur if the monopolist 
succeeds in its infringement action.  But in that case we are not 
measuring anything at all.  Rather, we are observing that no principle 
of patent policy protects fraudulently obtained patents, so there is 
nothing to place on the monopolist's side of the ledger.  Consumer 
harm may or may not occur, depending on the fortunes of the small 
firm who is saved from market exclusion by antitrust intervention.  As 
a result, we are dealing with a case in which an action excludes a 
rival without any consumer benefit.14  Measurement of consumer 
harm is not necessary to condemnation. 
 
 To be sure, there is an important sense in which consumer 
harm is essential to our analysis of antitrust practices.  Antitrust 
should not be in the business of condemning conduct that does not 
harm consumers.  But the measurement of consumer harm cannot 
serve as the basis for considering whether conduct violates '2 of the 
Sherman Act. 
 
 The remaining proposed tests discussed here are all designed 
to simplify '2 analysis by avoiding some of the measurement 
difficulties that "welfare" tests incur. 
 
"Sacrifice" 
 
 In Aspen the Supreme Court condemned conduct when the 
defendant 
                                                 
     12See 3 Antitrust Law &706. 
     13See 3 Antitrust Law &706e. 
     14See part 2A of our test for monopolization, text at note 1. 
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 was not motivated by efficiency concerns and ... was willing to 
sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in 
exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller 
rival.15 
 
So-called "sacrifice" tests for exclusionary conduct look at the 
defendant's willingness to sacrifice short-term revenues or profits in 
exchange for larger revenues anticipated to materialize later when a 
monopoly has been created or the dominant firm's position 
strengthened.  The strongest example of such a test is the 
recoupment test for predatory pricing given in the Brooke Group 
case, although it appeared in lower court opinions and the academic 
literature much earlier.16 
 
 The sacrifice test is also useful in unilateral refusal to deal 
cases to the extent that, if we wish to condemn refusals to deal at all, 
we must have a mechanism for identifying the very small subset of 
refusals that are anticompetitive.17  In Trinko the government relied 
on a sacrifice theory in arguing that the alleged refusal to deal did not 
                                                 
     15Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-
611 (1985). 
     16Brooke Group, note 2; A. A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 
1396, 1400-1401 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990) (advocating 
recoupment test). 
 
 See also Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and 
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 697, 698 
(1975): 
 
 "... the classically-feared case of predation has been the deliberate 
sacrifice of present revenues for the purpose of driving rivals out of the 
market and then recouping the losses through higher profits earned in the 
absence of competition.") 
 
See also the first edition of Antitrust Law: Phillip E. Areeda and Donald F. 
Turner, Antitrust Law &711b at 151 (1978) (similar); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust 
Law: An Economic Perspective 184 (1976) (similar).  The current law is described 
in 3A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &&725-730 (3d ed. 
2008). 
     17See 3B Antitrust Law, Ch. 7D-3. 
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satisfy any Sherman Act standard of illegality.18 
 
 The sacrifice test does not require balancing of gains and 
harms.  One looks at things exclusively from the defendant's 
perspective and asks whether the defendant has sacrificed short 
term profits in exchange for the benefits of monopoly down the road.  
One does not need to net out gains to the monopolist against loss to 
consumers, competitors, or the general economy. 
 
 A particular problem with sacrifice tests is that most 
substantial investments involve a short term "sacrifice" of dollars in 
anticipation of increased revenue at some future point.  The 
automobile manufacturer who constructs a new plant is certainly in 
such a position.  It spends money on the plant during a lengthy 
period of planning and construction, hoping to realize higher profits 
several years later after the plant goes into production.  To be sure, 
the profitability of the new plant need not "depend on" harmful effects 
on a rival, but in a concentrated market it is certainly likely to have 
such effects.  Further, the new plant might not succeed unless rivals 
were forced to reduce their own output; nevertheless, building a new 
plant under such circumstances is almost always procompetitive. 
 
 Likewise, product innovations are always costly to the 
defendant, and their success may very well depend on their ability to 
exclude rivals from the market, but neither of these factors is or 
should be decisive in subsequent antitrust litigation.  All innovation is 
costly, and many successful innovations succeed only because 
consumers substitute away from rivals' older versions and toward the 
innovator's version.  The goal of innovation is increased sales, and 
one increases one's sales either by bringing new customers into the 
market or else by taking customers from rivals.  As a result, 
willingness to "sacrifice" short-term profits in anticipation of later 
monopoly profits does not distinguish anticompetitive from 
procompetitive uses of innovation.  The distinction lies in the 
                                                 
     18See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 2003 WL 21269559, at *16-17, Verizon 
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) 
("conduct is exclusionary where it involves a sacrifice of short-term profits or 
goodwill that makes sense only insofar as it helps the defendant maintain or obtain 
monopoly power"); and id. at *19-20 ("If such a refusal involves a sacrifice of 
profits or business advantage that makes economic sense only because it 
eliminates or lessens competition, it is exclusionary and potentially unlawful."). 
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character of the innovation itself.19 
 
 The sacrifice test seems to work poorly in areas of '2 law 
unrelated to predatory pricing or refusal to deal.  Some exclusionary 
practices, such as exclusive dealing or tying, exclude immediately 
and are likely to be profitable to the dominant firm from the onset of 
the practice, so neither short term sacrifice nor subsequent 
recoupment is necessary to make the practice profitable.20  The 
same thing might be said of restrictive IP licensing practices, many of 
which are best analogized to either exclusive dealing or tying.21 
                                                 
     19See 3B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &776 (3d 
ed. 2008). 
     20See, e.g., 11 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &1802 (2d ed. 2004) 
(exclusive dealing foreclosing rivals); id, &1803 (same; output contract); id., &1804 
(same; raising rivals' costs). 
 
 In Rambus, Inc., 2006 WL 2330117 (FTC, Aug. 2, 2006), rev’d on other 
grounds, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C.Cir. 2008), the FTC held that the "sacrifice" test for 
exclusionary conduct did not apply.  Rambus reasoned that because its refusal to 
share information with JEDEC provided immediate benefit to Rambus, it would not 
qualify as conduct that involved the immediate sacrifice of profits in anticipation of 
exclusion of rivals, or that made no economic sense except for the elimination of 
competition.  The Commission opined that those tests might make sense in the 
context of refusal to deal or predatory pricing claims, but not here.  As the 
Commission explained: 
 
 As a matter of law, we recognize that the sacrifice test may be well-suited 
to certain types of Section 2 claims where the risk of interfering with 
vigorous competitive activity is heightened, but the test is not appropriate 
here. It misses conduct that reduces consumer welfare, but happens to be 
inexpensive to execute, and therefore does not involve a significant profit 
sacrifice. For example, defrauding the PTO in order to secure a patent that 
confers a monopoly demands little profit sacrifice, yet the Supreme Court 
has held that such fraud can violate Section 2.  Likewise, in this case, 
without reducing prices, forgoing sales, or even spending substantial funds 
beyond what it otherwise would have spent, Rambus's conduct may have 
imposed substantial costs on rivals and contributed significantly to the 
creation of monopoly power. In cases such as this, the Microsoft analysis 
-- with its focus on determining "whether the monopolist's conduct on 
balance harms competition" -- is the proper lens for scrutinizing allegedly 
exclusionary conduct. 
 
(numerous citations omitted) (to the extent it is relevant, HH was consulted by 
the defendant after the FTC's remedial order was entered). 
     21See Ch. 17G-2; Ch. 20E. 
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 Other practices, such as improper infringement suits, are 
often costly to the defendant in the short-run whether or not they are 
anticompetitive.  Indeed, the improper patent infringement suit is 
likely to be most costly to the dominant firm when the infringement 
defendant has the resources to defend it; and may not be particularly 
costly when the infringement defendants are nascent firms who are 
easily excluded from the market. 
 
"No Economic Sense" 
 
 The "no economic sense" test, which is similar to the sacrifice 
test in many respects, would refuse to condemn exclusionary single 
firm conduct "unless it would make no economic sense for the 
defendant but for its tendency to eliminate or lessen competition."22  
The "no economic sense" test offers good insights into when 
aggressive actions by a single firm go too far, but it can lead to 
erroneous results unless complicating qualifications are added.  Like 
the "sacrifice" test, it does not seek to measure general welfare or 
consumer welfare, nor does it seek to "balance" gains to the 
monopolist against losses to consumers, rivals, or others.  
Theoretically, an act might benefit the defendant very slightly while 
doing considerable harm to the rest of the economy, and it would be 
lawful.  Or conceivably, an act could be unlawful because its only 
benefit accrued from a lessening of competition, but the benefit was 
greater than any losses that lessened competition imposed. 
 
 Not all monopolizing conduct that we might wish to condemn 
is "irrational" in the sense that the only explanation that makes it 
seem profitable is destruction or discipline of rivals.  Indeed, 
monopolizing conduct is not necessarily costly to the defendant.  For 
example, supplying false information or failing to disclose important 
information to a government official or standard setting organization 
need not cost any more than supplying truthful information, but it can 
create monopoly under appropriate circumstances.23  Indeed, the 
                                                 
     22Brief for the United States and Federal Trade Commission as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15, Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).  See Gregory Werden, The "No 
Economic Sense" Test for Exclusionary Conduct, 31 J.Corp.L. 293 (2006); A 
Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary 
Conduct -- are There Unifying Principles, 73 Antitrust L.J. 375 (2006). 
     23E.g., Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 
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provision of false information may be less costly than provision of 
truthful information, for false information is easier and cheaper to 
manufacture.  Further, the provision of such information to a 
government official might be profitable (i.e., "make sense") whether it 
destroys a rival or merely if it results in increased output to the 
defendant.  For example, the firm that acquires a patent by making 
false statements to the patent examiner and then brings infringement 
actions against rivals might be dominant and bent on protecting that 
position.24  But it might also be one of many firms in a product 
differentiated market, seeking to do no more than protect its sales 
from a close substitute.  In either case the restraint on innovation and 
resulting harm to consumers is clear. 
 
 Other conduct, such as tying or exclusive dealing, can be 
profitable to the defendant from the onset but may also be 
anticompetitive if it excludes rivals and thereby injures consumers.25  
Such conduct makes "economic sense" if it merely enlarges the 
defendant's output but may be even more profitable if it raises rivals' 
costs or injures them so that they cannot compete effectively with the 
defendant. 
 
Conduct capable of excluding equally efficient rival 
 
 Judge Posner's definition of exclusionary conduct requires the 
plaintiff to show: 
 
 that the defendant has monopoly power and ... that the 
challenged practice is likely in the circumstances to exclude 
from the defendant's market an equally or more efficient 
                                                                                                                            
U.S. 172 (1965) (maintaining infringement suit on patent obtained by fraud); 
Rambus, Inc., 2006 WL 2330117 (FTC, Aug. 2, 2006) (providing false information 
to private standard setting organization with the result that organization 
unknowingly adopts standards protected by defendant's IP rights).  See also 
Netflix, Inc. v. Blockbuster, Inc., 2006 WL 2458717 (slip copy) (N.D.Cal. Aug 22, 
2006) (NO. C06-02361 WHA) (refusing to dismiss Walker Process style 
counterclaim against Netflix on business method patent, based on Netflix's alleged 
failure to disclose prior art in patent application). 
     24E.g,. Walker Process, id. 
     25E.g., United States v. Dentsply Int'l., Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 
2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1089 (2006) (condemning exclusive dealing in action 
brought by government). 
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competitor.  The defendant can rebut by proving that although 
it is a monopolist and the challenged practice exclusionary, 
the practice is, on balance, efficient.26 
 
 This definition has enjoyed some recognition in the case law.  
For example, in condemning the targeted package discounts at issue 
in LePage's, the Third Circuit observed that "even an equally efficient 
rival may find it impossible to compensate for lost discounts on 
products that it does not produce."27  As we show elsewhere, a 
specifically tailored discount aggregated over multiple products can 
exclude an equally efficient rival that makes only one or a subset of 
the products in question.28 
 
 The "equally efficient rival" test has also found acceptance in 
predatory pricing cases, particularly in discussions of how to identify 
a price as predatory.  It is not so obviously related to the 
"recoupment" requirement in predation cases.29 
 
 The reasoning behind the equally efficient rival test is that a 
firm should not be penalized for having lower costs than its rivals and 
pricing accordingly.  As a result, a price is predatory only if it is 
reasonably calculated to exclude a rival who is at least as efficient as 
the defendant.30  Judge Posner's own examples in defense of his 
definition pertain to pricing.  He writes that it 
                                                 
     26Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 194-195 (2d ed. 2001). 
     27LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 542 U.S. 953 (2004). 
     28See 3A Antitrust Law &749. 
     29See 3A Antitrust Law &&725-727. 
     30See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.,724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st 
Cir. 1983) (noting that an "avoidable" or "incremental" cost test for predatory 
pricing is irrational because it would be less costly for the defendant to halt 
production; and moreover, "equally efficient competitors cannot permanently match 
this low price and stay in business.").  See also MCI Communic. Corp. v. AT&T, 
708 F.2d 1081, 1113 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983) (similar, 
predatory pricing); Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 674 F.2d 498, 515 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated 
on other grds., 461 U.S. 940 (1983) (same, predatory pricing); Ortho Diagnostic 
Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 920 F.Supp. 455, 466-467 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
("below-cost pricing, unlike pricing at or above that level, carries with it the threat 
that the party so engaged will drive equally efficient competitors out of business, 
thus setting the stage for recoupment at the expense of consumers"). 
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 would be absurd to require the firm to hold a price umbrella 
over less efficient entrants.... [P]ractices that will exclude only 
less efficient firms, such as the monopolist's dropping his price 
nearer to (but now below) his cost, are not actionable, 
because we want to encourage efficiency.31 
 
Clearly we do not want low cost firms to hold their prices above 
their costs merely to suffer a rival to become established in the 
market. 
 
 The equally efficient rival definition of exclusionary conduct 
can be underdeterrent in situations where the rival that is most likely 
to emerge is less efficient than the dominant firm.  Consider the filing 
of fraudulent or otherwise improper IP infringement claims.32  The 
value of infringement actions as entry deterrence devices is greatest 
when the parties have an unequal ability to bear litigation costs. This 
will typically be before or soon after the new entrant has begun 
production.  The filing of a fraudulent patent infringement suit, unlike 
setting one's price at or a little above marginal cost, is a socially 
useless practice.  But the strategy might not be effective against an 
equally efficient rival, who could presumably defend and win the 
infringement claim.  In this case Judge Posner's definition of 
exclusionary conduct seems unreasonably lenient.  It exonerates the 
defendant in precisely those circumstances when the conduct is 
most likely to be unreasonably exclusionary. 
 
Raising Rivals' Costs (RRC) 
 
 Several anticompetitive actions by dominant firms are best 
explained as efforts to limit rivals' market access by increasing their 
costs.  Such strategies may succeed where more aggressive ones 
involving the complete destruction of rivals might not.  Once rivals' 
costs have been increased the dominant firm can raise its own price 
or increase its market share at their expense.33 
                                                 
     31Posner, Antitrust Law, note 26 at 196. 
     32See 3 Antitrust Law &706. 
     33See Thomas Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: 
Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209 (1986); 
Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 Am.Econ.Rev. 
267 (1983).  See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and 
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 RRC theories show that certain practices that have 
traditionally been subjected to antitrust scrutiny can be 
anticompetitive even though they do not literally involve the 
destruction of rivals.  Situations in which rivals stay in the market but 
their costs increase may be more likely to occur and exist in a wider 
variety than those in which rivals are destroyed.  Further, cost raising 
strategies might be less detectable and less likely to invite 
prosecution.  Indeed, a strategy of raising rivals' costs need not 
injure a rival severely at all if the dominant firm increases its own 
prices to permit smaller firms a price hike that compensates them for 
their cost increase.  As a result, RRC augments older antitrust 
theories of "foreclosure," but without some of the conceptual 
problems that accompanied foreclosure theories.  Many cases 
brought under both ''1 and 2 of the Sherman Act have 
acknowledged the theory.34 
                                                                                                                            
Critique, 2001 Col. Bus. L. Rev. 257. 
 
 For a critique, see Posner, Antitrust Law note 26 at 196.  However, Judge 
Posner's first objection is that reducing one's own costs may raise a rivals' costs by 
denying the latter the ability to exploit relevant scale economies.  While that is true, 
it does not suggest that every RRC strategy involves cost reductions to the 
dominant firm.  Second, Judge Posner notes, a strategy such as predatory pricing 
does not really raise a rival's costs but rather denies it revenue. 
 
 Closely related to RRC except more aggressive is the standard proposed 
in Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253 
(2003), which queries "whether the alleged exclusionary conduct succeeds in 
furthering monopoly power (1) only if the monopolist has improved its own 
efficiency or (2) by impairing rival efficiency whether or not it enhances monopolist 
efficiency." The second part of this test would condemn a firm for using practices 
that lowered its own costs if, in the process, they denied scale economies to a 
rival.  See, e.g., Elhauge, id. 324 (arguing that even if economies of scale are very 
substantial, above a 50% market share, the firm cannot use exclusive contracts to 
increase its output but must simply set its price).  The Elhauge test would also 
condemn a firm who used a practice that increased its sales beyond the point that 
its scale economies topped out, if in so doing it denied scale economies to a rival.  
See id. at 324 (illustration of firm whose tie, exclusive deal, or other agreement 
requires customers to purchase 70% of the market from it, even though its 
economies of scale top out at 40%).  Assuming such tests were desirable, they 
make severe demands on tribunals to measure relevant scale economies.  See 2A 
Antitrust Law &408. 
     34E.g., Microsoft, note 1, 253 F.3d at 70 (defendant's exclusionary contracts 
relegated rival Netscape to higher cost distribution channels); Dentsply, note 25, 
399 F.3d at 191 (similar; defendant's exclusive dealing arrangements relegated 
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 Of course, the law has never required complete market 
exclusion as a prerequisite to suit.  Indeed, some successful '2 
plaintiffs have both grown their market shares and earned high 
profits even through the period that the exclusionary practices were 
occurring.35 
 
 RRC is a sometimes useful but also incomplete definition of 
exclusionary practices.  Further, many practices that raise rivals' 
cost, such as innovation that either deprives rivals or revenue or 
forces them to innovate in return, are also welfare enhancing.  As a 
result, "raising rivals' costs" can never operate as a complete test for 
exclusionary conduct.36  One must always add "unreasonably," but 
that invariably requires some kind of balancing or trade off. 
                                                                                                                            
rivals to inferior distribution alternatives, citing 11 Antitrust Law &1802c); JTC 
Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 778-779 (7th Cir.1999) 
(members of cartel may have paid off suppliers to charge cartel rivals significantly 
higher prices, thus creating a price umbrella under which the cartel could operate); 
Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 123 F.3d 599, 614 (7th Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1123 (1998) (similar); Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 
F.3d 1467, 1478 (9th Cir. 1997), aff'd on nonantitrust grounds, 525 U.S. 299 (1999) 
(health care provider's policy of shifting indigent patients to rivals could have effect 
of raising their costs); Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
Legal and Professional Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1553 (10th Cir.1995) 
(dominant firm's practice of scheduling its own full slate of classes so as to conflict 
with rivals' specialized classes could have had effect of raising the rival's cost of 
distributing its own product); Premier Elec. Const. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors 
Ass'n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358 (7th 1987) (alleged agreement between union and 
contractors' association under which union would obtain fee from all employers 
without whom it had collective bargaining agreements, whether or not they were 
association members, to be paid to the association, probably intended to raise the 
costs of non-member contractors).  Cf. Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. 
Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1340 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting RRC claim that Blue 
Cross forced hospitals to submit lower bids for taking care of BC patients, with 
result that it had to impose higher charges on non-BC patients). 
     35E.g., Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 784 (6th 
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1148 (2003).  The plaintiff claimed that its market 
share would have grown even faster and that it would have earned even more 
profits but for the exclusionary conduct. 
     36This is apparently the source of Judge Posner's objection.  See Posner, 
Antitrust Law note 26 at 196, referring to RRC as "not a happy formula" because 
one way of raising rivals' costs is to be more efficient than the rival, thus denying it 
scale economies. 
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Summary 
 
 The development of a verbally simple monopolization test is 
more than an exercise in logic.  It requires numerous experience-
based judgments about the incentives that dominant firms face, the 
danger of false positives or occasionally negatives, and the 
measurement limitations of antitrust tribunals.  Each of the previously 
discussed definitions of anticompetitive unilateral conduct has much 
to be said for it, and each is helpful in the analysis of some types of 
exclusionary behavior.  However, none accounts for every type of 
behavior that we would wish to be addressed by '2.  Others might 
think differently. 
 
 
Formulations Requiring "Purpose" or "Intent" 
 
 In describing the conduct element of the monopolizing 
offense, numerous cases have employed terms such as "purpose," 
"intent," "willfulness," or "not inevitable."  For example, in the early 
Standard Oil decision,37 Chief Justice White noted the defendant's 
anticompetitive behavior but felt compelled to speak of intent: 
 
 [Defendant's many acquisitions and mergers give rise] in the 
absence of countervailing circumstances, . . . to the prima 
facie presumption of intent and purpose to maintain the 
dominancy over the oil industry, not as a result of normal 
methods of industrial development, but by new means of 
combination . . . with the purpose of excluding others from the 
trade and thus centralizing in the combination a perpetual 
control of the movements of petroleum and its products in the 
channels of interstate commerce. . . . 
 
  [This] prima facie presumption of intent to restrain trade 
. . .  to bring about monopolization . . . is made conclusive by 
considering [other elements of defendant's behavior in 
addition to the mergers and acquisitions]. . . .38 
 
                                                 
     37Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
     38Id. at 75. 
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And in the first Tobacco case, he found it necessary to speak of 
both "wrongful purpose and illegal combination."39 
 
 One might have supposed that any requirement of wrongful 
purpose was later obviated by Judge Learned Hand's declaration in 
Alcoa that 
 
 We disregard any question of "intent." . . . [Because we are 
satisfied that illegality does not depend upon a showing of 
practices that are unlawful in and of themselves and apart 
from the existence of monopoly power,] the issue of intent 
ceases to have any importance; no intent is relevant except 
that which is relevant to any liability, criminal or civil: i.e., an 
intent to bring about the forbidden act. . . .  In order to fall 
within '2, the monopolist must have both the power to 
monopolize, and the intent to monopolize. To read [this] as 
demanding any "specific" intent, makes nonsense of it, for no 
monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing. . . 
.40 
 
The Supreme Court endorsed Alcoa's general approach in the 
second Tobacco case.41  And in Griffith the Court found specific 
intent necessary only in attempt cases: 
 
 It is . . . not always necessary to find a specific intent to 
restrain trade or to build a monopoly in order to find that the 
anti-trust laws have been violated. It is sufficient that a 
restraint of trade or monopoly results as the consequence of a 
defendant's conduct or business arrangements. . . . Specific 
intent in the sense in which the common law used the term is 
necessary only where the acts fall short of the results 
condemned by the Act. . . .42 
 
At the same time, however, the Griffith Court also said: 
                                                 
     39United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 182 (1911). 
     40United States v. Aluminum Co. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 431-432 (2d Cir. 
1945). 
     41American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 814 (1946). 
     42United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948). 
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 [T]he existence of power "to exclude competition when it is 
desired to do so" is itself a violation of '2, provided it is 
coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise that power.43 
 
And later in the Grinnell case the Court said that: 
 
 The offense of monopoly . . . has two elements: (1) the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) 
the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence 
of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.44 
 
 Finally, in Professional Real Estate the Supreme Court 
concluded that alleged monopolizing conduct in the filing of an 
allegedly baseless copyright infringement suit could be evaluated 
only by considering the antitrust defendant's "subjective motivation" 
in bringing the suit.45 
 
 Not only are these formulations inconsistent, they are also not 
helpful and sometimes misleading. To be sure, in some cases the 
defendant's "purpose or intent" may be enlightening. For example, in 
cases of ambiguity "knowledge of intent may help the court to 
interpret facts and to predict consequences."46 
 
                                                 
     43Id. at 107. 
     44United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-571 (1966). 
     45Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 
508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993): 
 
 Only if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine 
the litigant's subjective motivation.  Under this second part of our definition 
of sham, the court should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals 
"an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a 
competitor.... (citations omitted). 
     46Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).  See 
also Taylor Pub. Co. v. Jostens, 216 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2000) (intent evidence 
useful for helping the court to characterize ambiguous conduct, quoting 11 
Antitrust Law &806e in the previous edition).  See use of intent evidence to 
interpret ambiguous conduct, see &b2. 
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 Thus knowledge of intent may be more helpful in cases 
involving practices such as refusal to deal, which can have 
numerous explanations and are very difficult to characterize as 
competitive or anticompetitive.  In its Aspen decision, which was 
such a situation, the Supreme Court elaborated.  In the case of 
attempt to monopolize, the plaintiff must show the defendant's 
"'specific intent' to accomplish the forbidden objective."  By contrast, 
in the case of monopolization "intent is merely relevant to the 
question whether the challenged conduct is fairly characterized as 
'exclusionary' or 'anticompetitive."47 
 
 In Brooke, which involved predatory pricing, the Supreme 
Court spoke of intent as nothing more than Judge Hand's 
consciousness of what one is doing.48  The Court referred repeatedly 
to the "intended victim" of predatory pricing, without elaborating on 
the nature of any intent showing that might be required.49  But the 
Court also made clear that, even if the defendant had intended 
anticompetitive consequences, the plaintiff's failure to show objective 
evidence of recoupment defeated its claim.50 
                                                 
     47Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 
(1985).  The Court's subsequent Trinko decision, note 18, said little about 
subjective intent, except to observe that in that particular situation involving an 
alleged refusal to deal: 
 
 the defendant's prior conduct sheds no light upon the motivation of its 
refusal to deal--upon whether its regulatory lapses were prompted not by 
competitive zeal but by anticompetitive malice. 
 
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. 
     48See text at note 40 (quoting Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 431-432). 
     49See, e.g., Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 225 ("intended effects on the firm's 
rivals"); ibid. ("intended victim" and "intended target"). 
     50Id. at 231: 
 
 Although Brown & Williamson's entry into the generic segment could be 
regarded as procompetitive in intent as well as effect, the record contains 
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that 
Brown & Williamson envisioned or intended this anticompetitive course of 
events....  Liggett has failed to demonstrate competitive injury as a matter 
of law, however, because its proof is flawed in a critical respect:  The 
evidence is inadequate to show that in pursuing this scheme, Brown & 
Williamson had a reasonable prospect of recovering its losses from 
below-cost pricing through slowing the growth of generics. 
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 Antitrust appraisal of conduct depends on an understanding of 
its likely anticompetitive consequences as well as its possible social 
benefits. In most cases an inquiry into subjective intent is 
unnecessary.  But sometimes the benefits of the defendant's conduct 
will not be apparent or persuasive unless the defendant identifies its 
purpose in so acting, shows the legitimacy of that purpose in terms 
of antitrust objectives, and that the challenged action is an 
appropriate and perhaps the least restrictive way of achieving that 
legitimate purpose. The critical point is that the nature and 
consequences of a particular practice are the vital consideration, not 
the purpose or intent.  Qualifying anticompetitive conduct must 
always be established first by objective facts about the relevant 
market and the defendant, quite apart from any manifestation of 
intent. 
 
 Further, any competitively energetic firm "intends" to prevail 
over its actual or potential rivals. The firm that drives out or excludes 
rivals by selling a superior product or producing at substantially lower 
costs certainly intends to do so. But to find the requisite "purpose or 
intent" in such conduct would be to read the behavior requirement 
out of the monopolization offense altogether and make monopoly 
unlawful per se.  This the courts clearly have not done.  More 
importantly, it confuses the "intent" to behave competitively with the 
intent to monopolize.  Indeed, in most circumstances the "intent" to 
do one cannot be distinguished from the intent to do another.  For 
example, the dominant firm who cuts price in order to increase its 
own sales undoubtedly knows -- and thus "intends"51 -- that the 
result will be increased pressure on rivals, declining sales, or 
perhaps even their exit from the market.52  In concentrated markets 
                                                                                                                            
 
Accord Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127 
S.Ct. 1069, 1071 (2007), which spoke of anticompetitive predatory buying as being 
for "anticompetitive purposes," but insisted on a test that measured market 
structure (recoupment) and required prices below cost. 
     51The common law often infers intent from knowledge.  See, e.g., 
Restatement (Second) Torts '825 (1977), defining an "intentional" invasion of 
property as occurring when the actor either (a) "acts for the purpose of causing it" 
or (b) "knows that it is resulting or is substantially certain to result from his 
conduct." 
     52See generally, 3A Antitrust Law, Ch. 7C (3d ed. 2008). 
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the "intent" to increase one's own sales substantially is equivalent to 
the "intent" to take sales from rivals; spending resources to 
distinguish the two is pointless and silly.  Further, even socially 
beneficial behavior can yield monopoly. 
                                                
 
 In a perfectly competitive market each firm "intends" to 
maximize its own profits and is completely unconcerned about 
responses from rivals.53  In that case it may be quite meaningful to 
speak of a firm as "intending" to increase its own profits, but not as 
"intending" to harm any particular rival.  But in the more concentrated 
markets in which most plausible monopolization claims are made, 
firms cannot act rationally without considering effects on, and 
responses of, particular rivals.  It becomes quite meaningless to 
speak, for example, of General Motors as "intending" to increase its 
own sales of pickup trucks, but not as "intending" to take those sales 
from Ford, Chrysler, or Toyota.54  As a result, any formulation which 
permits GM to "intend" to increase its own sales or profits, but that 
prohibits it from "intending" to injure rivals is nonsense. 
 
 In the great majority of antitrust cases talk of "purpose or 
intent" is largely diversionary or redundant.  Thus, in Standard Oil 
and the first Tobacco cases, Chief Justice White conclusively 
inferred wrongful purpose from wrongful conduct. The result would 
have been the same and the analysis clearer had he spoken 
exclusively of conduct and avoided any incorporation of "intent." 
 
 The same may be said of the term "willful."  The Grinnell 
Court stated the formula for the '2 offense as being monopoly plus 
"willful acquisition or maintenance." Although willfulness usually 
connotes something about intent, the Court contrasted "willful" with 
"justifiable." It indicated that a monopoly achieved or maintained 
because defendant's products were superior is not "willful." This is a 
misuse of language: a firm that deliberately creates and markets an 
overpoweringly superior product has "willfully" acquired the resultant 
monopoly.  Further, every firm "willfully" maintains its profits or 
 
     53On perfect competition, see 2B Antitrust Law &402. 
     54To be sure, one can imagine a situation where all increased sales come 
from new customers and none are taken from rivals, but such a situation does not 
exist when the strategizing firm and its rivals are in the same properly defined 
relevant market. 
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market share, or "wilfully" refuses to yield market share to new 
rivals.55 
 
 In sum, in defining the behavioral component of the 
monopolization offense, one must concentrate on conduct and define 
the characteristics of conduct that are undesirable. Despite loose 
language, this is in fact what the courts have attempted to do.  They 
have focused on conduct while talking about intent. 
 
Ambiguous conduct 
 
 The ambiguity problem most often arises when conduct did 
not or may not have had its intended consequences.  For example, a 
firm does not violate '2 by innovating a better product, even if the 
innovation has the effect of expanding or maintaining monopoly 
power.  Some innovations both harm rivals and fail to benefit 
consumers.  However, the consequences of innovation are difficult to 
predict, and even a dominant firm cannot be required to expand or 
innovate at its peril.  This suggests two things: first, ex ante rather 
than ex post analysis is the most helpful.  Second, considerations of 
subjective intent are sometimes essential, provided that exclusion 
has been objectively proven. 
 
 In the C.R.Bard case defendant Bard was found to have a 
                                                 
     55Both Alcoa and United Shoe Machinery also used the term "not 
inevitable."   See Alcoa, note 40 at 431 ("It was not inevitable that [Alcoa] should 
always anticipate increases in the demand for ingot and be prepared to supply 
them"); and United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. 
Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (speaking of Judge Hand's 
Alcoa decision as concluding that a firm had "'monopolized' if, regardless of its 
intent, it had achieved a monopoly by maneuvers which, though 'honestly 
industrial', were not economically inevitable, but were rather the result of the firm's 
free choice of business policies.")  Later in the same opinion Judge Wyzanski 
spoke of the source of USM's market power as not "an adaptation to inevitable 
economic laws" (id. at 343) -- something that would presumably characterize a 
natural monopoly market.  But if these formulations are meant to be a definition of 
monopolizing conduct they suffer from the same basic defect of failing to 
distinguish between socially beneficial and socially harmful conduct.  It is also not 
inevitable that a firm exclude rivals by building a better mousetrap or by building it 
more cheaply: to make "inevitability" the touchstone would thus be to condemn the 
very kind of conduct that it is the purpose of antitrust law to promote.  Clearly 
Judge Wyzanski was not using the phrase in this perverse sense.  And it would 
have been clear that Judge Hand was not either, except for his condemnation of 
Alcoa for expanding capacity to meet demand. 
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monopoly position in a patented "gun" for taking tissue samples from 
patients.56  While the gun itself was durable hardware, it used 
disposable, one-use needles, and these were originally supplied by 
both Bard and others, including the plaintiff.  Bard then modified the 
gun so that it would take only proprietary needles manufactured by 
Bard.  This exclusion of rival needle makers was the basis of the '2 
claim, in which a divided panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed liability. 
 
 A nondominant maker of biopsy guns would have no incentive 
to make a gun incompatible with others' needles unless the 
gun/needle combination were a significant improvement over prior 
technology.  The nondominant firm maximizes its profits, ceteris 
paribus, by maximizing compatibility.57  As a result, a finding of 
strong dominance of a properly defined relevant market is essential. 
 
 Further, both the patent laws and the general policy of the 
antitrust laws would permit Bard to innovate to make a better gun, 
even if the result were a re-designed needle that was incompatible 
with the needles of rivals.  Further, innovation is risky and 
undertaken under great uncertainty.  Many planned innovations do 
not meet with market success.  As a result, one cannot look ex post, 
proclaim that the innovated gun is no better than the earlier gun, and 
conclude that the innovation is anticompetitive.  The real question is 
what the innovator had in mind.  If Bard's intent was to develop a 
superior gun, but this required a unique needle, then Bard should not 
be penalized because its new gun/needle combination ended up 
working no better (or only a little better) than the old combination did. 
 
 Thus Aspen emphasized that the defendant did not refuse to 
participate in the skiing joint venture because it could offer a better 
product on its own or because customers had rejected the joint 
venture's offerings.58  To the contrary, customers preferred the joint 
venture.  Ski Co. did what it did only in order to injure a rival.  Thus 
the Court approved a jury instruction to the effect that exclusionary 
conduct by a dominant firm is unlawful when it "unnecessarily 
                                                 
     56C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc.., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 526 U.S. 1131 (1999). 
     57See the discussion infra. 
     58Aspen, note 15. 
 Hovenkamp, EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT 25 
excludes or handicaps competitors."59  This includes "conduct which 
does not benefit consumers by making a better product or service 
available--or in other ways--and instead has the effect of impairing 
competition.")60  The courts often say that such conduct lacks a 
"legitimate business purpose."61  What this means is that if the 
dominant firm marketed or structured its product in a way that made 
it more difficult for rivals or potential rivals to sell their product, and if 
this marketing or restructuring was not reasonably necessary to 
improve the defendant's own product, or if it produced more harm 
than reasonably necessary, then the dominant firm has violated '2.62 
 
Injury to Rivals 
 
 A sine qua non of anticompetitive conduct is that it enlarges 
(or preserves) the defendant's market share at the expense of rivals.  
Thus the first requirement for exclusionary conduct is injury to rivals.  
Exclusionary behavior must be conduct that prevents actual or 
potential rivals from competing or which impairs their opportunities to 
do so effectively. 
 
 But this term and the root idea are much too broad, for they 
embrace competitive as well as anticompetitive behavior: all 
                                                 
     59Aspen, note 15, 472 U.S. at 597. 
     60See, e.g., Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Radford Community Hosp., 
910 F.2d 139, 148 (4th Cir. 1990); Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639, 649 (10th Cir. 1987). 
     61Aspen, 472 U.S. at 597; Multistate Legal Studies, note 34, 63 F.3d at 
1550 (conduct not unlawful unless it lacks a "legitimate business justification); 
General Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 804 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(equating conduct "without a legitimate business purpose" with conduct "that 
makes sense only because it eliminates competition").  Other courts sometimes 
distinguish conduct that merely injures competitors from conduct that harms the 
"competitive process."  Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21 
(1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991). 
     62See, e.g., Multistate Legal Studies, note 34, 63 F.3d at 1550, where the 
defendant offered both a general bar review course, in which it had a dominant 
position, and a complementary professional responsibility course, while the plaintiff 
offered only the latter.  The court denied summary judgment on evidence that the 
defendant intentionally scheduled sessions of its general bar review course so as 
to conflict with the only times that the plaintiff's PR course could be offered, thus 
forcing students to take the defendant's PR course. 
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successful competitive moves tend to exclude, particularly in 
oligopoly markets.  Nevertheless, while some novel term might be 
preferable, we shall use the term "exclusionary" as a short-hand 
description of "monopolizing" conduct, even though it is not precisely 
descriptive. 
 
 So the first step in defining "exclusionary" conduct is to state 
what it clearly is not. Our concern about monopoly and the 
opportunities of rivals must not be allowed to obscure the objective of 
antitrust law, which seeks to protect the process of competition on 
the merits and the economic results associated with workable 
competition.63  Accordingly, aggressive but non-predatory pricing, 
higher output, improved product quality, energetic market 
penetration, successful research and development, cost-reducing 
innovations, and the like are welcomed by the Sherman Act.  They 
are therefore not to be considered "exclusionary" for '2 purposes 
even though they tend to exclude rivals and may even create a 
monopoly.64 
 
 We attempt no further catalogue of desirable behavior at this 
point, but rest for the moment on the desirability of behavior 
                                                 
     63Later discussions will show numerous instances where both courts and 
enforcement authorities appear to have sacrificed competitive objectives in order 
to protect particular competitors. 
     64We find quite unhelpful and even counterproductive the formulation given 
in some decisions that a '2 violation occurs when the monopolist uses its market 
power to "obtain a competitive advantage" over a rival.  Read literally, the 
"competitive advantage" formulation condemns any attempt by a dominant firm to 
take advantage of economies unavailable to smaller rivals.  The relevant question 
is not whether the monopolist uses its position to obtain a "competitive advantage," 
but how it does so. 
 
 The "competitive advantage" formulation was given in Griffith, note 42 at 
107, in reference to non-monopolistic "leveraging."  See 3 Antitrust Law &652.  But 
the Griffith statement was then quoted in Kodak in reference to monopolization 
itself.  See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451, 482-
483 (1992) (to the extent it is relevant, H.H. was consulted by the defendant after 
remand).  See also Poster Exchange v. National Screen Service Corp., 431 F.2d 
334, 339 n. 13 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971) (monopolist's 
decision to charge retail prices to competing wholesaler was unlawful if done "to 
gain a competitive advantage"); and Great Western Directories v. Southwestern 
Bell Tel., 63 F.3d 1378, 1386 (5th Cir. 1995) (apparently approving Poster 
Exchange formulation). 
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constituting competition on the merits -- the superior skill, foresight, 
and industry of which Judge Hand spoke. Antitrust law should not 
impose sanctions for the very conduct it would encourage.  Behavior 
that is no more restrictive of rivals' opportunities than is reasonably 
necessary to effect competition on the merits is and should be 
approved by Sherman Act '2.65  Such behavior is, after all, 
indispensable if the antitrust laws are to achieve their objective. 
Thus, "exclusionary" comprehends at the most behavior that not only 
(1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does 
not further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily 
restrictive way. 
 
Cost-reducing conduct 
 
 Conduct that reduces the defendant's costs typically injures 
rivals, except in highly competitive markets, but it virtually always 
benefits consumers.  Identifying the rare case where it does not 
taxes the tribunal's measurement capabilities so severely that it 
cannot be controlled without discouraging socially beneficial 
behavior. 
 
 One can imagine a scenario in which a firm builds a large 
plant that enables it to undersell rivals, does so for a period of time 
and then raises price after rivals have been destroyed.  At that point 
the firm might enjoy both reduced costs and monopoly prices, which 
may be higher than the preceding competitive price.  But such 
conduct has been analyzed under the rubric of above cost predatory 
pricing and universally rejected by the courts.66 
 
Output Increasing Conduct 
 
 Consumers are generally benefitted by higher output, which is 
nearly always accompanied by lower prices.  As a result 
considerable care must be exercised before conduct that clearly 
increases the defendant's output is condemned as monopolistic.  
When a firm is earning positive returns on each unit an output 
                                                 
     65This approximates Judge Wyzanski's formulation in United Shoe, note 55.  
See 3 Antitrust Law &614. 
     66Cf. DuPont (Titanium-Dioxide), 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980).  See 3A Antitrust 
Law &&737d, 741. 
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increase is profitable, quite aside from impact on competitors.  Since 
output increases are presumptively in the best interest of consumers 
as well a court must be wary of condemning above cost output 
increasing conduct.  Thus Judge Hand erred in Alcoa when he 
condemned the aluminum monopolist for embracing every 
competitive opportunity by building a larger plant with greater 
capacity to meet new demand.67 
 
 These observations are not categorical.  For example, 
predatory pricing involves a significant increase in output which must 
accompany price cuts to below cost levels.  But the increased output 
in a properly defined strategy of predatory pricing is only temporary, 
for the predation period will be followed by a "recoupment" period in 
which output will be reduced and prices increased.68 
 
 Further, an output increase by the dominant firm does not 
necessarily correspond with a marketwide output increase, and only 
the latter benefits consumers.  For example, extreme cases of tying, 
exclusive dealing, package discounts, or similar practices can 
produce an output increase for the defendant at above cost prices 
but also cause competitive harm.69  Or an improperly brought patent 
infringement suit might oust a nascent rival and enable the dominant 
firm to keep its own output higher, but overall market output would 
decline for lack of competition.70 
 
Actual or Prospective Consumer Harm; Balancing 
 
 Not all conduct that injures rivals is anticompetitive -- indeed, 
                                                 
     67United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945): 
 
 It was not inevitable that it [Alcoa] should always anticipate increases in 
the demand for ingot and be prepared to supply them. . . . [W]e can think 
of no more effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new 
opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity 
already geared into a great organization, having the advantage of 
experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel. 
     68See 3A Antitrust Law &&725-727. 
     69On tying, see 9-10 Antitrust Law, Ch. 17; exclusive dealing, id., Ch. 18; 
package discounts, 3A Antitrust Law &749. 
     70See 3 Antitrust Law &706. 
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most is not.  The conduct that '2 brands as anticompetitive must 
additionally cause or threaten harm to consumers from lower market 
output, higher prices, reduced innovation, or some other indicator of 
diminished competitiveness.  We consider whether this consumer 
harm must actually have occurred, or whether it may merely be 
threatened, and if the latter, the degree of the threat.  We also 
comment briefly on the nature of the proof and the relation to 
remedies. 
 
Relation to Plaintiff and Requested Relief 
 
 Monopoly harms consumers by producing higher prices, 
restricting innovation, or reducing the array of choices that 
consumers would face under more competitive conditions.  Properly 
defined monopolizing conduct harms consumers by creating 
monopoly, increasing its amount, or extending its duration.  Thus an 
expectation of consumer harm must always be at the logical end of 
any determination that a particular act "monopolizes," and thus 
satisfies '2's conduct requirement. 
 
 But this is not the same thing as showing that consumer harm 
has in fact resulted from the challenged practice.  This is clearest in 
the case of the government suit.  The government generally sues to 
"enforce" the antitrust laws, not to obtain recompense for completed 
harms.  The social cost of any harmful practice is minimized when 
the practice is apprehended before it occurs or in an early stage.  
Clearly the government must show that a certain instance of conduct 
is likely to cause consumer harm in the form of increased or 
prolonged monopoly, and that this conduct is not accompanied by an 
offsetting social benefit.  But to delay suit until consumer harm has 
actually occurred would be to increase the social cost of monopoly 
unnecessarily.  The proviso, of course, is that it may be more difficult 
to identify conduct as anticompetitive when the results have not yet 
materialized. 
 
 This principle is hardly unique to antitrust law.  For example, 
while the private plaintiff may sue the drunken driver only to 
recompense a completed wrong, such as wrongful death or property 
damage, the government may arrest and condemn the drunken 
driver who has not yet caused harm to anyone.  The point is that 
drunken driving is highly likely to cause social harm and it is less 
socially costly to arrest such a driver before rather than after that 
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harm occurs. 
 
 The private plaintiff suing only in equity resembles the 
government's position more closely but is still distinct.  The statute 
permits such a plaintiff to enjoin "threatened" harms.71  The main 
difference with the government's position is proximity.  For example, 
a dominant firm's fraudulent procurement and enforcement of 
patents might cause consumer harm only in several years, after the 
market sees the result of reduced competitiveness.  A particular 
consumer in this market might not be able to show sufficiently 
proximate injury to maintain even an equity suit.  But the government 
could do so, presumably without any showing of immediate harm to 
consumers.  By contrast, a competitor excluded by a fraudulent 
patent suit could sue immediately -- and may be required to do so via 
a compulsory counterclaim72 -- even though consumer injury had not 
yet occurred.  Indeed, we would not make the competitor's lawsuit 
depend on a showing that consumer harm would occur in the 
particular case.  The targets of improper infringement suits are often 
nascent firms which may or may not succeed in the market.  Antitrust 
goals are furthered by deterring such suits if they are improper, a fact 
which does not depend on proof that the competitor, if not victimized 
by the wrongful suit, would have succeeded in making the market 
more competitive. 
 
 Both consumers and competitors seeking damages must 
show actual harm.  Consumers must generally show actual harm in 
the form of higher prices or reduced innovation.  By contrast, 
competitors must show actual harm both to themselves and to the 
ordinary market processes that could otherwise be expected to 
produce or maintain competition.  Once again, however, consumer 
harm may be threatened rather than realized.  For example, the rival 
who successfully prosecutes a '2 counterclaim to an infringement 
suit based on an invalid patent will be able to obtain damages even 
though the consumer harm from this wrongful infringement suit is 
                                                 
     71See 15 U.S.C. '26 ("Any person ... shall be entitled to sue for and have 
injunctive relief ... against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust 
laws...."); see 2A Antitrust Law &326. 
     72See Critical-Vac Filtration Corp. v. Minuteman Intl., Inc., 233 F.3d 697 (2d 
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1019(2001) (antitrust counterclaim to patent 
infringement suit was compulsory and thus could not be brought after infringement 
suit was completed). 
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threatened rather than actual.73 
 
 But these differences in the nature of proof should not 
obscure the basic point: in all cases the plaintiff must show conduct 
that either has or is reasonably calculated to create, enlarge, or 
prolong monopoly, without substantial offsetting benefits.  In such 
cases consumer harm is always in prospect, even though it has not 
already occurred. 
 
Unjustified Conduct 
 
 Even though monopolistic conduct requires proof of actual or 
threatened consumer harm, the proof need not invariably be 
elaborate.  The easiest case is conduct by a monopolist that clearly 
injures rivals and has no business justification.  In that case 
consumer harm can sometimes be inferred from the injury to 
competitors itself.74  For example, little purpose would be served by 
requiring proof of consumer harm in a case where the defendant 
brought an infringement action on a fraudulently obtained patent.75  
The only purpose in bringing such a suit is improper exclusion of 
rivals.  About the best that can be said for such an action is it might 
fail and result in no harm at all, but it is not likely to produce a social 
benefit. 
 
Balancing Generally to be Avoided; Burden-shifting 
 
 The law of exclusionary practices lies at the center of 
antitrust's rule of reason, where it is often said that the court must 
"balance" the threat of competitive harm against consumer gains.  
We question that assumption.76  Many practices capable of creating 
or maintaining a monopoly by impairing the opportunities of rivals 
create no benefits at all.  For many others the claimed benefits could 
readily be achieved by a less harmful alternative. 
 
                                                 
     73See 3 Antitrust Law &706. 
     74On this point, see Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition 
Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 495 (1999). 
     75See 3 Antitrust Law &706. 
     76See generally Ch. 15. 
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 In Microsoft the D.C. Circuit appeared to state a balancing 
requirement for close cases.  If the plaintiff had shown a qualifying 
exclusionary act with an anticompetitive effect and the defendant had 
presented an unrebutted justification, then "the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs 
the procompetitive benefit."77  Interestingly, however, the court never 
attempted any real balancing.  In most cases it either condemned the 
conduct when the defendant had not offered an adequate 
justification, or refused to condemn it once the justification had been 
accepted. 
 
 Nevertheless, in at least a few cases conduct that causes 
some benefit and unavoidably threatens harm must be evaluated.  
On the one hand, the tribunal must have a way of deciding how to 
weigh them against each other.  On the other, no court could 
quantify the economic harm that might result from the defendant's 
exercise of market power and balance this against any efficiency 
gains said to result from it, at least not in close cases.  Of course, 
balancing need not be difficult in every case; one does not need a 
fine set of scales to know what will happen when an elephant sits on 
one side of a see-saw and a mouse on the other. 
 
 A burden-shifting analysis should enable courts to avoid 
"close" balancing in most situations.  The rule of reason applied in 
cases involving unilateral conduct need not differ significantly from 
that applied to multilateral conduct.78  The principal difference 
between '1 and '2 is that the existence of an agreement among 
competitors shifts the scale against the defendants.  As a result, in 
close cases it is proper to condemn the arrangement by resolving 
uncertainties against the defendant.  By contrast, when the 
challenged conduct is unilateral the court must be somewhat more 
cautious.  We would be inclined to resolve close cases in favor of the 
defendant.  But we re-emphasize, as Microsoft suggests, that cases 
involving (a) a truly exclusionary practice, (b) offset by a compelling 
efficiency explanation, and (c) with no less restrictive alternative will 
be uncommon. 
 
                                                 
     77Microsoft, note 1, 253 F.3d at 59. 
     78See 8 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &1512 (2d 
ed. 2005). 
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 The most important exception is predatory pricing.  Some 
balancing of benefits and harms may be essential because 
aggressive pricing appears to confer short-term benefits but may 
harm consumers in the long run.  In price predation cases the 
Supreme Court requires the dual showing of prices below cost and a 
reasonable prospect of "recoupment" during a subsequent period of 
monopoly prices.  In such a case the requirement of harms 
disproportionate to the benefits is met if the monopoly profits earned 
during the recoupment period exceed the cost of charging below-
cost prices, which constitutes the saving to consumers.79 
 
Conduct Rational Only for Dominant Firm; 
Creation vs. Maintenance of Monopoly 
 
 Most exclusionary conduct by dominant firms is strategic.  
Nondominant firms acting unilaterally typically lack the market 
position to make much strategic conduct work.  Consider the 
Microsoft litigation.80  A nondominant seller of computer operating 
systems would have every incentive to maximize compatibility with 
other types of software, such as internet browsers or word 
processors, even if it sold these applications itself.  After all, it would 
be competing in the market with sellers of other operating systems, 
and customer choice would be heavily driven by compatibility 
concerns.  But a market dominating seller of operating systems 
stands in a different position: by limiting compatibility with rivals' 
software applications it can force buyers to switch to its own 
applications.  Thus it becomes important to restrain the innovations 
of others or keep them out of the market. 
 
 In other cases conduct challenged as exclusionary could be 
profitable for either a monopolist or a non-monopolist.  For example, 
even a relatively small oligopolist in a product differentiated market 
might profit from fraudulent patent infringement suits calculated to 
protect its particular product variation from close copying.81 
 
 But both types of conduct are covered by the statute, which is 
                                                 
     79These matters are taken up in Ch. 7C. 
     80See note 1. 
     81On such suits, see 3 Antitrust Law &706. 
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concerned with the maintenance, or prolongation, or monopoly as 
well as with its creation.  For example, Grinnell and later Trinko 
spoke of the offense as "the willful acquisition or maintenance of 
[monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident."82 
 
Substantiality 
 
 To find that a monopolist's act may improperly impair rivals' 
opportunities and threaten consumer welfare does not say how 
substantial a contribution that act has made or may make to 
achieving or maintaining the monopoly. The effect may in fact be 
marginal or even inconsequential. The act may be incapable of 
making a significant contribution, abandoned before it could have 
had any such effect, or seem on balance not to have been significant 
when compared to scale economies or superior skill as sources of 
the particular defendant's power. 
 
 However, because monopoly will almost certainly be 
grounded in part in factors other than a particular exclusionary act, 
no government seriously concerned about the evil of monopoly 
would condition its intervention solely on a clear and genuine chain 
of causation from exclusionary act to the presence of monopoly.  
And so it is sometimes said that doubts should be resolved against 
the person whose behavior created the problem.83  When we cannot 
truly find as a fact that an exclusionary act was significant to the 
defendant's monopoly, it is said, the defendant must bear the risk of 
                                                 
     82Grinnell, note 44, 384 U.S. at 570-571 (emphasis added).  The Supreme 
Court restated this formulation in Verizon Communications v. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 
407.  See also Aspen, note 15, 472 U.S. at 602 (speaking of the "purpose to create 
or maintain a monopoly," quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 
307 (1919).  These formulations are widely quoted or paraphrased.  See, e.g., 
Kodak, note 64, 504 U.S. at 483 ('2 violated by wilful actions designed to maintain 
defendant's monopoly position when not supported by valid business 
justifications); Christianson v. Colt Indus., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988) ('2 violated by 
wilful maintenance of monopoly power as opposed to growth or development that 
results from a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident); Hanover 
Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 481, 486 (1968) (noting and 
approving lower court's conclusion that restrictive lease policies were designed to 
maintain defendant's monopoly); C.R. Bard, note 56, 157 F.3d at 1371 (similar). 
     83Cf. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) (damages). 
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the ignorance created by its own misconduct. The conclusion has 
merit, but the reasoning needs to be restated. 
 
 Any one exclusionary act may seem trivial. Indeed, we shall 
often be unable to find that several such acts, taken together, 
probably "caused" or contributed significantly to a defendant's power. 
Yet, such acts can determine the often marginal choice of an actual 
or potential rival deciding whether to enter or expand.  In that event, 
it may be fitting to presume the exclusionary act "significant" or 
"causally related" to the monopoly power being challenged. That is 
the sense in which the defendant is made to suffer the uncertain 
consequences of its own undesirable conduct. 
 
 But before such a formula can properly be used against the 
defendant, it must at least appear plausible to an informed observer 
that the exclusionary act could have had, or would probably have, a 
significant relationship to the defendant's monopoly.  In sum, 
"exclusionary" behavior should be taken to mean conduct other than 
competition on the merits, or other than restraints reasonably 
"necessary" to competition on the merits, that reasonably appear 
capable of making a significant contribution to creating or 
maintaining monopoly power. 
 
Business Torts or Unfair Methods of Competition 
 
 State laws on "unfair competition" or business torts provide 
remedies for a variety of competitive practices thought to be 
offensive to proper standards of business morality. Under these 
laws, false and misleading advertising, trade disparagement, and 
"misappropriation" of trade values created by another may entitle 
victimized buyers or competing sellers to damages and equitable 
relief. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act empowers the 
Commission to terminate (1) "unfair methods of competition," and (2) 
"unfair and deceptive acts or practices."84  Particularly since 1938, 
when Clause (2) was added by amendment, the courts have given 
the Commission extremely wide latitude in expanding the scope of 
enjoinable conduct without any showing of injury to competition.85 
                                                 
     84Section 5 is also a jurisdictional vehicle for FTC action against violations 
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 
     85See, e.g., 83 Cong. Rec. 3287 (1938) ("... under this section the 
Commission may stop false advertising with reference to all products.  They have 
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 Even if one defines "exclusionary" conduct with an eye only 
toward injunction, most conduct that is "unfair" under state tort law or 
FTCA '5 fails to be "exclusionary" under Sherman Act '2. The FTC 
Act was clearly conceived as a supplement to the Sherman Act, a 
vehicle for evolving, through administrative expertness, prohibitions 
of conduct thought contrary to important consumer interests in 
honesty and fair dealing quite aside from monopoly. There is no 
private right of action for violations of the FTC Act, and the act is not 
part of the "antitrust laws" for violation of which private parties may 
sue and recover treble damages. 
 
 Thus automatically identifying practices "unfair" under the 
FTC Act or business tort law as "exclusionary" under '2 is not 
consistent with the statutory scheme. The Sherman Act was deemed 
a vehicle for incorporating common law notions of restraint of trade, 
but certainly not the whole common law of business torts. The 
concern of '2 is with monopoly, not unfairness or deception.  
Accordingly, it is not enough under '2 to find that a firm has engaged 
in "unfair" conduct; the antitrust tribunal must also decide that the 
conduct has had, or is likely to have, the effect of significantly 
impairing the ability of rivals to compete. 
 
 The first and perhaps most important difference between the 
common law of business torts and the Federal Trade Commission 
Act's coverage of unfair and deceptive acts is the lack of any 
requirement of market power or competitive effects.  Most of the law 
in this category focuses exclusively on conduct, and thus no inquiry 
is made whether the conduct is reasonably calculated to create or 
preserve a monopoly, or indeed, if monopoly is even plausible in the 
market under scrutiny. 
 
                                                                                                                            
always used that power; but in the past they have had to show that the false 
advertisement was injurious to some competitor.  We are doing away with that 
requirement in this bill and are providing that if an advertisement is false and 
deceptive it may be stopped if it is injurious to the public.") (Mr. Wheeler).  See 
also Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1941) ("The 
failure to mention competition in the latter phrase ["unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices"] shows a legislative intent to remove" the requirement of injury to 
competition, and "the Commission can now center its attention on the direct 
protection of the consumer where formerly it could protect him only indirectly 
through the protection of the competitor."). 
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 Of course, in the presence of substantial market power, some 
kinds of tortious behavior could anticompetitively create or sustain a 
monopoly, and it would then warrant condemnation under '2.86  As a 
result, it is wrong categorically to condemn such practices under '2 
or categorically to excuse them.  But the important point is that the 
law of business torts or unfair practices was developed without 
regard to its tendency to create a monopoly, and there is little more 
than an accidental overlap between the kinds of practices thought to 
be unfair or tortious and the kind that can support a '2 offense. 
 
 Thus many if not most misrepresentations or other practices 
held actionable in tort or under '5 do not qualify as anticompetitive or 
exclusionary for '2 purposes, even when done by a dominant firm. In 
many instances, few buyers are misled. The FTC is entitled to insist 
"upon a form of advertising clear enough so that . . . 'wayfaring men, 
though fools, shall not err therein.' "87  In other instances, the effects 
are transitory, either because the misrepresentation was episodic or 
because buyers quickly learn the truth.  For example, much of the 
law of business torts or misrepresentation is targeted at the firm that 
comes quickly into business, makes numerous sales on the basis of 
false claims, and then disappears or becomes judgment proof before 
consumers can obtain redress.  That government intervention in 
such cases is appropriate can be deemed beyond controversy, but 
the relief to be given would not be relief from any real or threatened 
monopoly. 
 
 In other cases, such as those requiring disclosure of facts 
wholly unrelated to product qualities, antitrust might well view the 
order rather than the conduct to be "anticompetitive."88  And proof of 
compensable injury to particular buyers for misleading 
representations does not necessarily establish significant damage to 
competing sellers, whose conduct may, for example, have been no 
more exemplary. 
                                                 
     86See Ch. 7E. 
     87GM v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940). 
     88For example, Mohawk Refining Co. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 818 (3rd Cir. 1959) 
(not only prohibiting petitioner from failing to disclose that its oil was reclaimed 
from previously used oil, but also from selling such oil at all, notwithstanding a 
finding that the product was "identical with all other finished motor oils as to 
composition, quality, and utility."). 
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 Thus, while tort or FTC law provides some learning and 
experience that can be used by antitrust courts in identifying 
undesirable practices that may properly be deemed "exclusionary," 
the mere fact that the practices are undesirable in this sense is not 
enough.89 
 
Relationship to Other Antitrust Offenses 
 
 It is accepted law that a monopolist violates the Sherman Act 
if it "has acquired or maintained . . . monopoly . . . by means of those 
restraints of trade which are cognizable under '1 [of the Sherman 
Act]."90  But this does not mean that all violations of '1 necessarily 
establish the "monopolizing" offense under '2.  The monopoly must 
be acquired or maintained "by means of" the conduct proscribed 
under '1, and not all violations of '1 have the requisite causal effect. 
Take, for example, a case in which a monopolist has imposed 
minimum resale price maintenance agreements on its distributors. 
Such agreements were traditionally per se unlawful under '1, but 
they do not create or enhance the monopolist's market power by 
curtailing the opportunities of its actual or potential competitors.91  If 
anything, the higher retail prices on the monopolist's goods enhance 
their opportunities. 
                                                 
     89An additional problem with incorporating state business tort law is that it 
varies, and sometimes widely, from state to state. It would be unseemly for an 
antitrust court to seek and then apply the law of the state most hostile to a 
particular practice.  Even if the injury were confined to states accounting for a 
significant portion of the monopolist's business, diversity would in all likelihood 
remain; and even if not, it makes no sense to treat two monopolists differently 
under '2 because of fortuitous differences in state tort law. In short, antitrust courts 
would at the least have to formulate a "federal" law of business torts. But rather 
than engage in such an exercise, it seems far more sensible to deal directly with 
the question of what is "exclusionary" in light of the purposes of '2. 
     90Griffith, note 42 at 106. 
     91See generally Ch. 16B.  The per se rule against resale price maintenance 
was overruled by the Supreme Court's decision in Leegin Creative Leather 
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007).  It is conceivable that the high 
retail margin protected by minimum resale price agreements would lead retailers to 
prefer handling the monopolist's product to that of any newcomer who would 
thereby fail to obtain adequate retail representation. But this would be a rare case. 
Our point is that a Sherman Act '1 violation is not automatically or necessarily an 
"exclusionary" act for '2 purposes. 
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 Similar caution must be taken with violations of the Clayton 
Act: price discrimination,92 exclusive dealing93 and tying 
arrangements,94 and acquisitions95, in violation of ''2, 3, and 7 
respectively.  A monopolist from whom large buyers have coerced 
discriminatorily low prices has not by such price discrimination 
augmented its monopoly power; rather, the discrimination reflects a 
weakening of its power.  A tying arrangement does not usually 
increase monopoly power in the tying-product market, and one that 
affects a small percentage of sales of the tied product does not 
significantly impair the opportunities of rivals in that market.96 
 
 In sum, whether or not violations of other antitrust provisions 
also constitute monopolizing conduct depends on the factual and 
analytical reasons behind those other proscriptions.  They must be 
assessed in terms of '2 purposes.  The other side of the coin is that 
practices that harm rivals unnecessarily may be violations of '2 
when committed by a dominant firm, even though they would not be 
violations of other provisions when no dominant firm is involved.  For 
example, forced bundling by the monopolist can violate '2 even 
when the "separate product" requirement that tying law imposes on 
nonmonopolists is not present.97  The monopolist's refusal to deal 
may be unlawful even when lack of agreement precludes any finding 
of a "boycott".98  Upon a few occasions courts have condemned 
price discrimination by a monopolist when the technical requirements 
of the Robinson-Patman Act could not have been met.99 
                                                 
     92See 14 Antitrust Law, Ch. 23. 
     93See 11 Antitrust Law, Ch. 18. 
     94See 9 & 10 Antitrust Law, Ch. 17. 
     95See 4-5 Antitrust Law, Chs. 9 - 11. 
     96See 9 Antitrust Law, Ch. 17B-2. 
     97See 3B Antitrust Law &777. 
     98See 3B Antitrust Law, Ch.7D. 
     99E.g., United Shoe, note 55 at (condemning USM's price discrimination in 
lease terms; leases are not reachable by the Robinson-Patman Act, which covers 
only sales). 
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 The point is that '2's highly general proscription of 
"monopolistic" practices is not cabined by any specific statutory 
formulation, and thus can be both less than or more than the 
prohibitions of the other antitrust laws.  As noted previously, this 
gives the courts more flexibility to fashion legal doctrine respecting 
dominant firms; but it also makes the statute more difficult to apply, 
particularly to novel conduct. 
 
Power Essential 
 
 The definition of anticompetitive conduct by the dominant firm 
must be flexible and not too categorical.  Defining exclusionary 
conduct as conduct that harms rivals unnecessarily can dispense 
with technical requirements that are essential in the law of price-
fixing, tying or exclusive dealing, or other practices.  Such an 
approach is appropriate, for anticompetitive strategic behavior by 
dominant firms comes in many kinds, many of which may not be 
known or even anticipated today. 
 
 But defining monopoly conduct in a flexible manner places a 
premium on unambiguous establishment of substantial and durable 
power.  If courts find monopoly power too readily, they may be 
correspondingly unwilling to condemn exclusionary practices that are 
anticompetitive when practiced by a true monopolist, but ambiguous 
or harmless when the defendant is not a monopolist.  These rules 
will then be applied to true monopolists as well.  Worse yet, courts 
may condemn practices that are harmless or even beneficial when 
practiced by non-monopolists. 
 
 As a court's confidence increases that the defendant before it 
is a true and durable monopolist, it can also more confidently 
condemn practices that harm rivals unnecessarily.  As a result, 
"monopoly power" should be found only after rigorous application of 
the fundamental principles of market definition and market power 
measurement.  When courts find substantial market power merely 
because a firm's customers are "locked in" to its aftermarket parts or 
service;100 or where the defendant's franchise contract prevents the 
buyer from substituting another's goods,101 then they are no longer 
                                                 
     100E.g., Kodak, note 64, and &564. 
     101See 2B Antitrust Law &519. 
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dealing with the kind of substantial market power that should be the 
concern of '2. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 To summarize: 
 
$  Assuming that monopoly power has been established, 
the unlawful exclusionary conduct that '2 requires 
consists of acts that (1) are reasonably capable of 
creating, enlarging or prolonging monopoly power by 
impairing the opportunities of rivals; and (2) that either 
(2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are 
unnecessary for the particular consumer benefits that 
the acts produce, or (2c) produce harms 
disproportionate to the resulting benefits. 
 
$  The behavioral component is not defined by "purpose," 
"intent," or similar language. It can be rationally defined 
only in terms of conduct.  However, knowledge of intent 
may sometimes aid in the interpretation of ambiguous 
conduct. 
 
$  Proof of actual consumer harm is generally 
unnecessary, but the challenged conduct must be of a 
type that the anticipated end result is actual consumer 
harm.  Of course, the private plaintiff must prove the 
requisite actual or threatened harm to itself. 
 
$  The given definition of monopolizing conduct is flexible 
and frees the court of doctrinal rigidity, but it requires 
an extremely careful determination that the defendant 
has substantial market power. 
